

Security for Classroom Learning Partner

by

Karin Iancu

Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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ABSTRACT

This MENG thesis implements a security system for a classroom presentation system called the Classroom Learning Partner (CLP). The goal of the security system is to prevent cheating on electronic quizzes. CLP is a system that uses Tablet PCs in the classroom to enhance learning and encourage interaction between the instructor and students. The instructor creates exercises which are displayed on slides on the students' Tablet PCs. The students complete the exercises and submit them to the instructor and to a central database. The security implementation makes it possible to extend this framework for electronic quiz administration. This thesis discusses current cheating prevention methodologies and extends them to account for electronic quiz-taking scenarios. The basis of the security system is SQL Server authentication for authentication to a central database, and SSL for encryption of network traffic.

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1 Introduction

The goal of this project is to implement a security infrastructure for an educational technology, Classroom Learning Partner (CLP) in order to administer quizzes electronically during class. The main goal is to help ensure the validity of the quizzes by preventing cheating. The CLP infrastructure prevents cheating in two ways: by enforcing authentication to the system and by encryption of network traffic.

There are a number of system components that contribute to the security of CLP. It is crucial that each component of the system and all traffic between each component be protected, so that an unauthorized party cannot access and modify private data. This protection is achieved by requiring authentication to each component, and by encrypting traffic. The system uses SQL Server authentication and SSL for encryption. Denial of service and nonrepudiation are not addressed.

This project is valuable, not only because of the benefit for deployments planned for the academic year 2006-2007, but also because of the potential for future enhancements and developments, such as automated quiz grading.

2 Classroom Learning Partner

Classroom Learning Partner (CLP) is a system being developed with the goal of improving student learning in the classroom. It will allow for increased interaction between the instructor and students. [Koile and Singer, 2006a] and [Koile and Singer, 2006b] show that students who used this system did better in an introductory computer science class than students who did not use the system.

Classroom Learning Partner employs Tablet PCs to provide the instructor with immediate feedback from students working exercises in-class and wirelessly submitting anonymous answers to the instructor. The system allows the instructor to create questions that are displayed on slides on the students' Tablet PCs. The students' answers are submitted to a database, where an aggregator then combines them into equivalence classes. The aggregated answers are sent to the instructor, who can use them to assess the students' understanding of the material presented thus far and pace the class accordingly [Koile and Shrobe, 2005] & [Koile and Singer, 2006b].

2.1 CLP System Architecture

The system is currently being developed by the CLP group, headed by Dr. Kimberle Koile, at the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. It consists of the following main components:

- Instructor Authoring Tool (IAT)¹, which helps the instructor create slides and exercises.
- Ink Interpreter, which interprets the student's handwritten answers by producing semantic representations. [Rbeiz, 2006]
- Aggregator, which groups the student answers into equivalence classes using the semantic representations produced by the interpreter. [Smith, 2006]

¹ The current version of the Instructor Authoring Tool was implemented by CLP group members Kevin Chevalier, Capen Low, Michel Rbeiz, and Kenneth Wu. [Chen, 2006] describes an earlier implementation.

The following diagram illustrates the architecture of the system.




Figure 1: Steps 1-8 represent the process of using Classroom Learning Partner

1. Before class, the instructor creates a PowerPoint presentation and a set of exercise objects using the CLP authoring tool. The exercise information is both embedded in the slides and stored as a separate object in the database.
2. Prior to class, the instructor retrieves the presentation from the database. The instructor also may store the presentation on his or her tablet and use the central database for archival.
3. Presentation slides are broadcast to student machines or students' machines automatically load them from a file server or the central database.
4. When a slide containing an exercise is displayed, each student enters ink answer, which is interpreted on his or her machine.
5. Each student's ink answer is submitted to the database.
6. Aggregator retrieves the interpreted ink answers, aggregates them, and produces summary data.
7. Summary data is stored in the database.
8. Summary data is displayed on the instructor's machine.

2.2 Current Implementation

The first version of Classroom Learning Partner is functioning and has been deployed in the classroom. The following is a description of a classroom scenario.

- *The student* walks into class, picks up tablet, and logs in with MIT username and password
- *The tablet* connects to MIT to authenticate (using Kerberos user name and password), gets a ticket and user name
- *CLP on the tablet* logs student into Windows system as “student” user name
- *A script on the tablet* creates a link to the student’s MIT directory, configures services for the MIT user name, adds an entry to the database (database CLPRecords, table TabletRecords) with user name and time of log in, and starts up CLP. The entry serves as a mapping between student and machine names²

Figure 2 shows an example of the table in the database.

² Student answers to in-class exercises are still anonymous. The instructor is unaware of the mapping between student and machine names. The information is used only by an educational assessment expert when investigating student performance.

ComputerName	KerberosName	LoginTime
AC10	kr...iley	3/22/2006 1:08:50
CLP10		3/15/2006 1:08:29
AC10		3/15/2006 1:08:34
CLP4		3/15/2006 1:08:37
CLP3	...iley	3/15/2006 1:08:45
CLP16	...yd	3/15/2006 1:08:46
AC7	...eng	3/15/2006 1:08:51
CLP7		3/15/2006 1:09:05
CLP8	...stev	3/15/2006 1:09:07
AC9	...n	3/15/2006 1:09:20
CLP18		3/15/2006 1:09:39
CLP2	...m	3/15/2006 1:09:41
AC8	...n	3/15/2006 1:09:59
CLP6	...e	3/15/2006 1:10:02
CLP13	...rd	3/15/2006 1:10:29
CLP9		3/15/2006 1:10:35
CLP11	...n	3/15/2006 1:10:52
CLP14	...rd	3/15/2006 1:10:53
CLP17	...e	3/15/2006 1:11:52
CLP12	...rfj	3/15/2006 1:12:57
CLP5	...y	3/15/2006 1:13:02
CLP15		3/15/2006 1:37:40
CLP14	...rd	3/15/2006 1:47:28
CLP6	...iley	3/17/2006 1:10:14
AC10	...eng	3/17/2006 1:10:28
CLP3	...n	3/17/2006 1:10:41
CLP10	...n	3/17/2006 1:10:41
CLP8	...e	3/17/2006 1:10:48
CLP12	...rfj	3/17/2006 1:10:49
CLP9		3/17/2006 1:10:54
AC9		3/17/2006 1:11:04
CLP4	...yd	3/17/2006 1:11:04
AC8	...stev	3/17/2006 1:11:08
CLP16	...n	3/17/2006 1:11:24
CLP14	...ent	3/17/2006 1:13:02
CLP16		3/22/2006 1:08:59

Figure 2

- *CLP on the tablet* downloads slides from the instructor's website automatically (because storing the slides on a file server proved to be the fastest).
- *The student* clicks connect
- *The tablet* connects to the virtual classroom set up by CLP for wireless communication

- *The student* views slides
- *The instructor* displays a slide containing an exercise
- The exercise slide shows up on each student's *tablet*. Figure 3 shows an example of a slide that is displayed on the tablet during a class.




Figure 3

- *The student* works the exercise, writing an answer in digital ink with a tablet stylus pen in the answer box provided (Figure 4) and presses submit




Figure 4

- *CLP on the tablet* collects the ink and passes it to the ink interpreter
- *The ink interpreter* returns a semantic representation of the ink
- *CLP on the tablet* creates student answer object, transfers student answer object to database (database IAT, table Answers and table StudentAnswers) over TCP and transfers answer to instructor over RTP
- *The instructor* gets student answers
- When the *aggregator* is running on the instructor machine, the instructor does not get all the student answers, but rather only the representative ones released by the aggregator.

See figure 5 for a diagram illustrating the above scenario.




Figure 5

3 Quiz-taking Issues

The purpose of this MENG thesis is to design the security for CLP so that it can be used to administer quizzes electronically in class. CLP already provides the instructor with the framework to create and distribute exercises electronically in class, so quiz administration is a natural addition. When designing the security system, it is important to look at the current quiz-taking model and expand upon it for the electronic quiz-taking scenario.

Electronic quiz-taking offers numerous advantages over conventional quiz-taking methodologies. Certain tasks, such as distribution, collection, and scoring of quizzes, could be automated when a quiz is administered electronically [Dyreson, 1996]. This functionality would allow the instructor more time to focus on improving student learning and less time on quiz administration. Another advantage with electronic quiz administration is that it would be easy to collect statistics from the quiz [Dyreson, 1996]. The statistics could be used to determine student improvement in the class as well as overall class performance on a particular question or style of question. Finally, electronic quizzes could facilitate testing specifically in computer science classes by allowing students to write code in the same environment that they use for homework and projects. While electronic quiz-taking does offer some advantages over conventional quiz-taking, it is not without its costs. Electronic quiz-taking provides increased opportunities for students to cheat, and students may cheat in more creative ways that are harder for instructors to detect.

3.1 Problem: Cheating/Benefits?

According to Davis [Davis, 1993], between 40 and 70 percent of college students have cheated at some point. Evidence suggests that if students are given the opportunity to cheat, they will take it [Bushweller, 1999]. Cheating is dishonest and prevents the cheating student from understanding the material to his full potential. Therefore, it is very important for teachers to do all that they can to prevent cheating. While there are many forms of cheating, this thesis focuses on how to prevent cheating on in-class quizzes.

3.1.1 Conventional quiz-taking

The traditional classroom quiz-taking scenario involves students taking a quiz on paper while the instructor or other proctor watches to make sure that no student is cheating.

The following is a list of ways in which students may cheat:

- a) Access the answers dishonestly during the quiz
 - a. Copy off of another student
 - b. Bring a source to copy from
 - i. Cheat sheet
 - ii. Writing on hand
 - iii. Electronic device that contains the answers
 - c. Communicate with a source outside of the classroom
- b) Change either answer or score after the quiz [Bushweller, 1999]
- c) Access quiz questions before the quiz [Bushweller, 1999]
 - a. Break in to location where quiz is stored and steal a copy of the quiz
 - b. Break the seal on a section of the quiz ahead of time [Bushweller, 1999]

- c. Pass quiz questions of a standardized quiz to students in a later time zone
 - d. Give questions to students in a later class
- d) Impersonate a student in the class and take the quiz in his place

3.1.2 Electronic quiz-taking

The electronic quiz-taking scenario involves students taking a quiz on an electronic device that may or may not have the capability to connect to the internet or other devices that students are using. For our purposes, each student will take the quiz on an individual electronic device. The devices have some sort of network connectivity through which the students obtain quiz questions, prove their identity, and submit quiz answers. Cheating in the electronic quiz-taking scenario is fundamentally the same as in the conventional scenario, however there are new opportunities for students to revise and expand upon conventional cheating methodologies.

Let's revisit the ways that students cheat and examine how technology affects the scenarios.

- a) Access the answers dishonestly during the quiz
 - a. In addition to the conventional cheating methods described above, students also have the following possibilities of cheating at their disposal
 - i. A student may attempt to access the quiz answers from a database or instructor's machine where they are stored, or another student's machine after he answers the questions.
 - ii. A student may attempt to use the device that the quiz is being taken on to communicate with other students in or out of the class.
 - iii. A student may try to view another student's answers over the network traffic.

- b) Change either answer or score after the quiz [Bushweller, 1999]
 - a. There are potentially more ways a student can do this in the electronic scenario.
- c) Access quiz questions before the quiz [Bushweller, 1999]
 - a. There are more ways to do this in the electronic scenario, one of which is to eavesdrop on the network when the instructor submits/reads the exercises and answers to/from the database.
- d) Have a friend impersonate a student in the class and take the quiz in his place
 - a. This method might be easier to do in the electronic case since some electronic quiz-taking scenarios may not require that the student be present in a classroom.

3.2 Solution

There are a number of solutions to prevent cheating. We look at some of the conventional methods and discuss how they can be applied to the electronic scenario.

3.2.1 Conventional solutions

Teachers have developed methods to counter cheating. The methods are not all foolproof, and each has its own advantages and disadvantages. The following is a list of some of the methods.

- a) Be alert during the quiz to make sure that students are not copying off of or communicating with each other or using a cheat sheet or other device to get the answers.
- b) Keep backup records of the quiz and the scores.
 - a. Photocopy each student's quiz after the exam to make sure that they do not change their incorrect answers after the quizzes are returned.

- b. Keep backup copies of the grade book so that if a student steals it and modifies some grades, it will be easier to catch and fix the changes.
- c) Ensure that the quizzes and quiz questions are secure before the exam and change the quiz questions when another class is taking the same quiz later in the day.
 - a. Teachers can prevent students from breaking in to a room where a quiz is being stored by making sure that it is locked securely and that all people with access to the room can be trusted to restrict access from unauthorized people.
 - b. When a student broke the seal of the essay question on an ETS administered test, ETS later wrapped the questions in cellophane to deter students from opening it since there is a greater risk of getting caught [Bushweller, 1999].
 - c. In order to prevent students from divulging quiz questions to other students who are taking the quiz at a later time, instructors should change the questions.
- d) Quizzes should be proctored by an instructor who is familiar with the students in order to prevent a student from impersonating a peer and taking the quiz in his place. An alternative to this is to require all students to bring their id to the quiz and use it as an authentication mechanism.

Many of these methods rely on students' fear of getting caught. That is, they will not prevent cheating, but will make it likely that the student will get caught if he does cheat. In most cases, the possibility of getting caught is enough to prevent cheating altogether.

3.2.2 Electronic Solutions

While electronic quiz-taking introduces new ways in which students can cheat, it also provides the instructors with new ways to detect and prevent cheating. Most of the

cheating situations that are introduced by the electronic quiz-taking scenario can be prevented with a good authentication and encryption system.

The following describes how the instructors can enhance the methods to prevent cheating with technology.

- a) In addition to watching students in class to make sure that they are not copying off of one another or a cheat sheet, ensure that all network traffic is encrypted so that students cannot eavesdrop on the network traffic and view each other's submissions.
- b) Since all submissions are stored electronically, it is easier to store backup copies.
- c) A good authentication system will help prevent students from obtaining the exam ahead of time. As an additional measure, instructors may set up a system to determine if a break in has occurred.
- d) Quizzes should be proctored by an instructor who is familiar with the students in order to prevent a student from impersonating a peer and taking the quiz in his place. An alternative to this is to require all students to bring their id to the quiz and use it as an authentication mechanism.

4 Preventing Cheating with CLP: Security System Architecture

In order to use CLP to administer quizzes in class, the system must be fortified to prevent cheating. The most important things to consider are data privacy and integrity, so that only authorized users can access and participate in the quiz. These two properties are achieved via authentication and encryption.

4.1 Authentication

In order to access any component of the system, it is necessary to authenticate to it. The component then grants access based on the particular user's permissions. It is necessary to employ a good authentication mechanism to ensure that the parties with access cannot be impersonated. It is also necessary to have a strong system to set up permissions, so that an impersonator cannot modify the access list (either by adding a new name or by changing some existing permissions).

A good authentication system will prevent the following scenarios:

- A student accesses the instructor's computer to view the questions and/or answers before class.
- A student accesses the database to view the questions and/or answers before class.
- A student accesses the instructor's computer during class to view the answers.
- A student accesses the database during class to view the answers.
- A student accesses another student's computer during class to view his answers.

- A student accesses the database during class to view another student's answers.
- A student from another class accesses the database to view the questions before his own class

4.2 Encryption

All traffic in the system must be encrypted. This encryption is necessary in order to prevent eavesdroppers from obtaining information to which they are not entitled.

The following transmissions must be to encrypted:

- a) Instructor sends exercises and answers to the database.
 - The instructor does this task in preparation for the class, so if a student could view this traffic, he would have access to the exercise questions and answers before class.
- b) Instructor reads exercises and answers from the database.
 - If this traffic is viewed, it is the same scenario as above.
- c) Instructor broadcasts slides to the students.
 - Whether or not to encrypt this step is a design decision. The benefit of encrypting this information is that it prevents students in other classes from viewing the exercises.
- d) Students submit answers to the database.
 - This task prevents cheating that is equivalent to looking at another student's paper in a traditional quiz setting. In a non-quiz setting, it could make some students feel more comfortable to know that other students cannot see their answers.

e) Instructor reads student answers from the database (either individually or in aggregated form).

- If this traffic is viewed, it is the same scenario as above.

The following figure illustrates the above scenarios.




Figure 6

4.3 Outside Scope

Nonrepudiation is not addressed in the implementation of the system. Nonrepudiation is a way to ensure that a message was sent and received. This would be a way to prevent a student from claiming that he did not receive a quiz question.

This system does not protect against a denial of service attack. A denial of service attack floods a system so that it can no longer function. A student might attempt this attack if he decides he would rather not take the quiz that day. Neither of these issues has been addressed.

The quiz-taking scenario addressed in this thesis requires that the quiz is administered with the students in the classroom. It is necessary to consider additional scenarios in order to secure a quiz that is taken from a remote location.

5 Design Choices and Implementation

As mentioned earlier, this MENG thesis implements a security system for CLP that consists of authentication and encryption. The following is a description of the sequence when CLP is used for quiz administration:

1. The instructor or database administrator creates a new password for the student account in the database. (see appendix for instructions on how to do this, or should I put instructions somewhere else?).
2. The student walks in to class and picks up a tablet from the front of the classroom. Note that the tablets are in the control of the instructor between classes, so she can control the tablet settings and what programs are installed before class.
3. The student logs in to the tablet with his MIT Athena user name and password.
4. The tablet connects to MIT and logs the student in to Athena via the Kerberos system.
5. Once the MIT Athena credentials are verified, the student is logged in to Windows under the user name “student”. All students will be logged in to the tablet as “student”.
6. Next, a script runs which adds an entry to the database (database CLPRecords, table TabletRecords) with the user name, tablet name, and time of log in of the student and starts up CLP.
7. At this point, the slides are downloaded onto the tablet.

8. The student starts up CLP and connects to the classroom. When prompted for a password, the student enters the password assigned by the instructor.
9. The student takes the quiz by viewing the quiz questions on the slides and answering them in an answer box provided. Once the student is satisfied with his answer, he presses submit. This causes the student's identity to be checked and if it is verified, the answer is encrypted with SSL and submitted to the database. The student can resubmit his answer as many times as he would like. The instructor should instantiate a policy of how to deal with multiple submissions. One reasonable policy is to only look at the latest submission. This is similar to conventional quiz-taking, where a student may cross out or erase his answer, so the instructor only sees the latest one.
10. The instructor or database administrator should change the student password immediately after class so that no student can log in again.

The password should be changed at the end of class so that students cannot submit new answers after class. As long as the students are only allowed to insert answers, changing the password is not a critical issue: if the students don't have the ability to delete, and a timestamp is submitted with each insert, the instructor will see when an answer was submitted and can disregard answers submitted after the quiz ended.

5.1 Authentication

Students authenticate to the database using SQL Server authentication. Currently, anyone with an MIT account can log in to a CLP tablet during class with his Athena user name and password. When CLP starts up, a login prompt appears that asks the user for his user name and password. This information is saved in the CLP code and used to authenticate the student when he submits an answer to the database.

SQL Authentication versus Windows Authentication

In general, it is recommended to use Windows authentication over SQL authentication when authenticating to an MS SQL Server 2000 database since Windows authentication has many of the security considerations built in and automatically configured. However, Windows authentication is not possible for the current classroom architecture, since each student does not have a distinct Windows account that he is logged in to.

One disadvantage of using SQL Server authentication is that the password travels over the network in clear text. It must be encrypted so that no one can eavesdrop on the network packets and see the password. We use SSL to encrypt the password and solve this problem. This encryption does not add any overhead over using Windows authentication since even Windows authentication still necessitates encryption of all other network traffic.

Student Database Accounts

It is important to ensure that each user connects to the database with an account that has the fewest privileges necessary for him to accomplish what he needs. Each student will log in to the database with a password supplied at the beginning of class. The student's account will only have the capability to insert into the database and not to read or delete entries.

The student account should be created and maintained by the instructor, teaching assistant, or other administrator who would normally have access to student records. As mentioned earlier, in the current implementation, there is one student account with which every student logs in. Students are distinguished from each other by mapping their Athena user name to their tablet name and storing that information in another table in the database. This is done with a script that automatically runs on the tablet when the students log in. It is a bit awkward to have the students' identifying information in a separate database, so it might be beneficial to create an individual database account for each student in the class.

5.2 Encryption

All communications with the SQL Server are encrypted with SSL³. This encryption prevents an unauthorized person from viewing network traffic. A server certificate⁴ is installed on the computer on which the SQL Server database resides, and the database is set up to only allow encrypted connections. Whenever a client connects to the SQL Server, the connection and all traffic between the client and server will be encrypted with SSL.

SQL Server 2000 supports both SSL and IPsec for encryption. In order to use IPsec, all client machines must have a static IP address. It is also necessary to configure every machine in the network to use IPsec. SSL does not have this administrative overhead. The only setup necessary for SSL encryption is on the server machine, thus making it easy to add new client machines to the system.

³ See [] for a description of how SSL works.

⁴ The server certificate is obtained from the CSAIL Certificate Authority.

5.3 Vulnerabilities

The system specification requires that the instructor change the student password immediately after class. This means that if a student finishes the quiz early and leaves class, the password that was given in class will still be valid. The student may try to access the database remotely and add a new submission before the instructor changes the password. In order to do this, the student would need to know on which machine the SQL Server is running, which database and table on the SQL Server contains the student's quiz submissions, and how to access the table and insert new entries. It is unlikely that the student would obtain all this information. However, it is important to note that if he does, the system could be compromised. An important and not difficult addition to the system would be a mechanism for having the system automatically change the password after all students have logged in.

When a student first logs in to the tablet, a script runs that does two things: it mounts the user's Athena directory on the tablet (as a new device) and inserts an entry, which pairs student user names with machine id, into the TabletRecords table in the CLPRecords database on the SQL Server. A student may try to cheat by accessing files in his or her Athena directory. It is important, therefore, that the part of the script that mounts the student's Athena directory be removed. Note that access to the directory may not be a problem if the quiz is open notes, depending on the instructor's wishes. The other potential vulnerability in the script is that it needs to access the database to insert the mapping between the student user name and machine name. The script uses its own

account, but the user name and password is displayed in the script. If the students know where the script is located on the computer, they could look at it to obtain the user name and password and use that to insert a new entry into the table that maps their user name to a different machine. The script account only has permission to insert new entries and not to delete or read entries, so that helps to prevent further unauthorized access.


In the current system configuration, students can still access the internet during class, and therefore, potentially communicate with each other or other students outside of class to cheat. This communication can be prevented easily with a firewall that is set up to only allow the necessary connections. Another option is to leave the system as is and monitor the network traffic to make sure that students are not communicating with each other. This approach is similar to the current cheating prevention model at MIT, since although there is no way to guarantee that the students will be honest, the fear of getting caught is usually enough to prevent cheating, and MIT does have an academic honesty policy in place to which students are expected to adhere.

All of the above vulnerabilities are easily addressed and will be considered in the next version of the system.

6 Testing

The system was tested in a mock classroom setting with one instructor and 2 student tablets⁵. The “quiz” is stored on the Desktop of the tablet. Each student logs in to CLP with the given username and password and loads the quiz from the Desktop. The students submit their answers by pressing the submit button in CLP. The quiz testing was done twice: once with encryption disabled and once with it enabled.

Figure 7 shows the TabletRecords table in the CLPRecords database, which contains the mapping from a student’s computer name to his Kerberos name.



ComputerName	KerberosName	LoginTime
CLP16	karin	9/7/2006 8:16:57 PM
CLP10	karin	9/7/2006 8:17:11 PM
CLP2	student	9/7/2006 8:17:17 PM
CLP10	karin	9/7/2006 8:41:56 PM
CLP16	karin	9/7/2006 8:42:17 PM
CLP10	karin	9/7/2006 8:45:24 PM
CLP2	student	9/7/2006 8:45:30 PM
CLP10	karin	9/7/2006 8:52:11 PM
CLP2	student	9/7/2006 8:52:16 PM
CLP10	karin	9/7/2006 8:54:36 PM
CLP2	student	9/7/2006 8:54:41 PM
CLP16	karin	9/7/2006 8:54:49 PM
CLP10	karin	9/8/2006 4:44:07 PM
CLP2	karin	9/8/2006 11:21:10 PM
CLP16	student	9/8/2006 11:21:15 PM
CLP16	student	9/8/2006 11:24:06 PM
CLP2	karin	9/8/2006 11:26:59 PM
CLP16	student	9/8/2006 11:28:06 PM
CLP10	karin	9/8/2006 11:28:11 PM
CLP2	karin	9/8/2006 11:47:23 PM

Figure 7

⁵ It was also tested with more than 2 student tablets, however for simplicity of the documentation, I discuss a scenario with 2 student tablets.

Figure 8 shows the ink student submissions.





Figure 8

As you can see, the student using CLP16 wrote “test student” and the student using CLP10 wrote “test karin”. These exercises were submitted in an unencrypted session. Figures 9 and 10 show the submissions in the database. The StudentAnswers table in the IAT database (figure 9) shows that the student using CLP16 has submitted an answer, which is identified by the AnswerID 233 and the student using CLP10 has submitted an answer identified by AnswerID 234.



AnswerID	MachineID	SessionID	TimeStamp
233	CLP16	142	9/8/2006 11:30:25
234	CLP10	142	9/8/2006 11:30:35

Figure 9

The AnswerIDs 233 and 234 and the semantic representations that correspond to their ink answer can be found in the Answers table in the IAT database (figure 10).

AnswerID	ExerciseID	BoxIndex	Ink	SemanticRep
222	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">hi</Chunk></Answer>
223	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">to</Chunk></Answer>
224	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">you</Chunk></Answer>
225	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">hi</Chunk></Answer>
226	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">Ni</Chunk></Answer>
227	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">to</Chunk></Answer>
228	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">you</Chunk></Answer>
229	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">hi student</Chunk></Answer>
230	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">hi Karin</Chunk></Answer>
231	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">hi student</Chunk></Answer>
232	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">hi student</Chunk></Answer>
233	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">test student</Chunk></Answer>
234	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">test Karin</Chunk></Answer>
235	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">123</Chunk></Answer>
236	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">123756</Chunk></Answer>
237	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">(112)</Chunk></Answer>
238	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">(434)</Chunk></Answer>
239	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">student</Chunk></Answer>
240	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">Karin</Chunk></Answer>
241	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">123</Chunk></Answer>
242	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Strong">456</Chunk></Answer>
243	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">#12</Chunk></Answer>
244	4	0	<Binary>	<Answer Type="STRING"><Chunk Type="STRING" Confidence="Poor">(5*34)</Chunk></Answer>

Figure 10

The same thing was done with encryption enabled. Figures 11 and 12 show the tables in the encrypted session. The student answers can be seen in the database in figure 10 in AnswerIDs 239 and 240.





Figure 11



AnswerID	MachineID	SessionID	TimeStamp
240	CLP10	143	9/8/2006 11:49:12
241	CLP16	143	9/8/2006 11:49:32

Figure 12

Notice that there is no difference in how the answers are stored in the database in the encrypted and unencrypted versions. We must examine the network traffic in order to see the difference.

The following two network traces show the unencrypted traffic when the Athena name to tablet name mapping is made in the database. Notice how easy it is to see that the database name is CLPRecords. Also notice how the SQL statement

“INSERT INTO TabletRecords VALUES ('CLP10','karin',GETDATE())” is visible
in the second trace.

```

0000 00 0f b0 71 61 67 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 08 00 45 00 ...qag..?S....E.
0010 01 b1 05 63 40 00 80 06 be 69 80 1e 1a 47 80 1e ...c@....i...G..
0020 1a f7 05 99 f0 82 1b 9c f4 49 eb b1 b7 ab 50 18 .....I....P.
0030 fd 33 37 1e 00 00 04 01 01 89 00 33 01 00 e3 23 .37.....3...#
0040 00 01 0a 43 00 4c 00 50 00 52 00 65 00 63 00 6f ...C.L.P.R.e.c.o
0050 00 72 00 64 00 73 00 06 6d 00 61 00 73 00 74 00 .r.d.s..m.a.s.t.
0060 65 00 72 00 ab 6e 00 45 16 00 00 02 00 29 00 43 e.r..n.E.....)C
0070 00 68 00 61 00 6e 00 67 00 65 00 64 00 20 00 64 .h.a.n.g.e.d. .d
0080 00 61 00 74 00 61 00 62 00 61 00 73 00 65 00 20 .a.t.a.b.a.s.e.
0090 00 63 00 6f 00 6e 00 74 00 65 00 78 00 74 00 20 .c.o..n.t.e.x.t.
00a0 00 74 00 6f 00 20 00 27 00 43 00 4c 00 50 00 52 .c.o..'.C.L.P.R
00b0 00 65 00 63 00 6f 00 72 00 64 00 73 00 27 00 2e (e.c.o.r.d.s.'.
00c0 00 08 41 00 4d 00 41 00 4e 00 44 00 41 00 43 00 ..A.M.A.N.D.A.C.
00d0 53 00 00 00 00 e3 08 00 07 05 09 04 d0 00 34 00 S.....4.
00e0 e3 17 00 02 0a 75 00 73 00 5f 00 65 00 6e 00 67 .....u.s..e.n.g
00f0 00 6c 00 69 00 73 00 68 00 00 ab 6a 00 47 16 00 .l.i.s.h...j.G..
0100 00 01 00 27 00 43 00 68 00 61 00 6e 00 67 00 65 ...'.C.h.a.n.g.e
0110 00 64 00 20 00 6c 00 61 00 6e 00 67 00 75 00 61 .d. .l.a.n.g.u.a
0120 00 67 00 65 00 20 00 73 00 65 00 74 00 74 00 69 .g.e. .s.e.t.t.i
0130 00 6e 00 67 00 20 00 74 00 6f 00 20 00 75 00 73 .n.g. .t.o. .u.s
0140 00 5f 00 65 00 6e 00 67 00 6c 00 69 00 73 00 68 ._e.n.g.l.i.s.h
0150 00 2e 00 08 41 00 4d 00 41 00 4e 00 44 00 41 00 ....A.M.A.N.D.A.
0160 43 00 53 00 00 00 ad 36 00 01 71 00 00 01 16 C.S.....6..q....
0170 4d 00 69 00 63 00 72 00 6f 00 73 00 6f 00 66 00 M.i.c.r.o.s.o.f.
0180 74 00 20 00 53 00 51 00 4c 00 20 00 53 00 65 00 t. .S.Q.L. .S.e.
0190 72 00 76 00 65 00 72 00 00 00 00 08 00 07 f7 r.v.e.r.....
01a0 e3 13 00 04 04 34 00 30 00 39 00 36 00 04 34 00 .....4.0.9.6..4.
01b0 30 00 39 00 36 00 fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0.9.6.....

0000 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 00 0f b0 71 61 67 08 00 45 00 ..?S....qag..E.
0010 00 aa 02 47 40 00 7f 06 c3 8c 80 1e 1a f7 80 1e ...G@.....
0020 1a 47 f0 82 05 99 eb b1 b7 ab 1b 9c f5 d2 50 18 .G.....P.
0030 42 b4 f3 9e 00 00 01 01 00 82 00 00 01 00 49 00 P.....I.
0040 4e 00 53 00 45 00 52 00 54 00 20 00 49 00 4e 00 N.S.E.R.T. .I.N.
0050 54 00 4f 00 20 00 54 00 61 00 62 00 6c 00 65 00 T.O. .T.a.b.l.e.
0060 74 00 52 00 65 00 63 00 6f 00 72 00 64 00 73 00 t.R.e.c.o.r.d.s.
0070 20 00 56 00 41 00 4c 00 55 00 45 00 53 00 20 00 .V.A.L.U.E.S. .
0080 28 00 27 00 43 00 4c 00 50 00 31 00 30 00 27 00 (.'.C.L.P.1.0.'.
0090 2c 00 27 00 6b 00 61 00 72 00 69 00 6e 00 27 00 ,'.k.a.r.i.n.'.
00a0 2c 00 20 00 47 00 45 00 54 00 44 00 41 00 54 00 ..G.E.T.D.A.T.
00b0 45 00 28 00 29 00 29 00 E.(.)).

```

Now look at the network trace when it is encrypted and notice how it is unreadable
without the key.

```

0000 00 0f b0 71 61 67 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 08 00 45 00 ...qag..?S....E.
0010 01 c6 08 4f 40 00 80 06 bb 68 80 1e 1a 47 80 1e ...O@....h...G..
0020 1a f7 05 99 f0 9e 79 89 c0 00 fa 21 26 50 50 18 .....y....!&PP.
0030 fd 35 37 33 00 00 17 03 01 01 99 0a 36 99 7c 29 .573.....6.|)
0040 58 b2 30 ba 39 6c bf 8f 27 03 38 7e 2e c6 e7 de X.0.9l...'.8~....
0050 9b 5f 8c c1 c3 44 e5 da 85 b0 b7 25 3d 66 60 7a .....D.....%=f`z
0060 3b 25 41 34 d8 27 9a 5b 99 7e 12 f6 30 42 86 16 ;%A4.'.[.~...OB..
0070 da 4a 5a c4 be 42 70 9f ce 9e 5d 12 d6 12 7a 35 .jZ..Bp...]...z5
0080 c8 36 a2 e0 d3 ca c8 b2 2b 1a cd e5 c1 10 ba 0b .6.....+.....
0090 60 bb 01 af 50 dc c6 db 02 0a 5b 64 df ef 24 06 ...p.....[d. $.
00a0 25 01 1b d9 fa 45 fe e8 91 07 ea 15 8d 21 e8 e5 %...E.....!...
00b0 99 28 fa 97 a2 99 66 8d 4e 68 57 c4 33 2c ce ae (.f.Nhw.3,..
00c0 d3 a6 b3 43 f7 09 1b 5f 6d fc f1 8f b5 88 98 f3 ...C...m.....
00d0 28 62 38 9a 2b 0b aa c1 ef be 9f f2 f9 f6 c3 23 (b8.+.....#
00e0 d9 e9 f1 37 c6 3a 63 78 fe 6f c2 87 95 a9 a7 be ...7.:cx.o.....
00f0 cd 86 b7 af cf 42 f5 f1 29 40 9a 5d af a0 02 a9 .....B.)@.].
0100 67 3b b8 19 31 fc 87 31 75 25 9f 86 1b 32 41 9c g;..1..1u%...2A.
0110 4e 05 67 c8 49 f3 3e 68 2e 08 62 d4 f0 b2 30 e5 N.g.I.>h..b...0.
0120 9f 8e 2d 6b 3c 3f 99 45 22 30 cd 86 c1 25 f2 19 ...-k<?.E'0...%..
0130 48 c1 1d ea cc 92 4f e6 30 44 74 2c 71 00 b9 52 H....O.0Dt,q..R
0140 ca 02 55 44 66 f4 a6 df a9 da f4 0a c1 06 fc 54 ..UDf.....T
0150 21 23 64 9b 6d e5 cb 87 96 a9 85 a9 81 ec 71 79 !#d.m.....qy
0160 1e 1a 85 50 3b e6 f5 6e cc 4b b2 bb 84 19 c1 e2 ...P;..n.K.....
0170 67 f8 65 7f 89 d5 c8 2d 74 a8 ec e2 7c a0 a1 bd g.e....-t...|...
0180 3f 44 eb dc 1b c5 dc b0 f1 e8 6f 5f 78 a7 0d 79 ?D.....o_x..y
0190 0c 3c 38 e0 f2 b1 0b 9b 8f 91 81 70 77 65 0b 4a .<8.....pwe.J
01a0 dd ed 46 b4 60 c9 eb 6b 63 95 18 c8 03 d4 58 53 ..F...kc.....XS
01b0 e9 3e fc 1a 3a 99 93 46 7d cd b9 27 15 e3 3b 1a .>.....F}...';.
01c0 57 9d 58 b9 7c 18 ea e1 26 7e 8a c3 a8 4b 68 7c w.X.|...&~...Kh|
01d0 ef b5 f2 e2 .....

```



```

0000 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 00 0f b0 71 61 67 08 00 45 00 ..?S.....qag..E.
0010 00 bd 23 5d 40 00 7f 06 a2 63 80 1e 1a f7 80 1e ..#]@....C.....
0020 1a 47 f0 9e 05 99 fa 21 26 50 79 89 c1 9e 50 18 .G.....!&Py...P.
0030 42 9f 3c 7b 00 00 17 03 01 00 90 51 f8 80 b3 b4 B.<{.....Q....
0040 33 36 d7 b4 43 e0 c5 a4 8a ff ef 33 af 32 7a 86 36..c.....3.zz.
0050 ed 02 6b 9d 7b 08 f3 6d ba 24 0f 81 54 2e bc ac ...k.{..m.$..T...
0060 a5 04 3f 85 aa 56 02 6b 0d 76 c5 c9 17 99 4a 50 ..?.V.k.v....JP
0070 27 51 fa 72 fa 9b 72 13 35 2d fb 32 96 f9 ff 63 'Q.r...r.5-.2...c
0080 94 f4 48 d2 c9 48 c7 42 b0 37 fc 85 f1 12 64 a6 ..H..H.B.7....d.
0090 91 29 1d 7f b3 31 46 33 47 45 1f 38 47 23 ec 74 .)....1F3GE.8G#.t
00a0 7c eb 36 20 0b cc 05 70 e3 2f 32 4b b6 9c d3 17 |.6 ...p./2K....
00b0 fc 7d 90 4f f5 11 f4 b3 76 ad 42 a3 e9 05 9d 35 .}.O....v.B....5
00c0 96 96 21 41 99 0a 63 c7 69 7d f4 ..!A..c.i}.

```

The same situation holds with the student submissions to the database. In the next two examples, the SQL statement is sent in clear text, and in the last two, it is encrypted.

0000	00 12 3f 53 02 ce 00 0f b0 71 61 67 08 00 45 00	..?s.....qag..E.
0010	01 eb 05 21 40 00 7f 06 bf 71 80 1e 1a f7 80 1e	...!@.....q.....
0020	1a 47 f0 87 05 99 8d 99 82 49 ef ea 7c 55 50 18	.G.....I.. UP.
0030	41 03 49 79 00 00 03 01 01 c3 00 00 01 00 ff ff	A.Iy.....
0040	0a 00 02 00 00 00 e7 58 00 09 04 d0 00 34 58 00X....4X.
0050	49 00 4e 00 53 00 45 00 52 00 54 00 20 00 49 00	I.N.S.E.R.T..I.
0060	4e 00 54 00 4f 00 20 00 41 00 6e 00 73 00 77 00	N.T.O..A.n.s.w.
0070	65 00 72 00 73 00 20 00 56 00 41 00 4c 00 55 00	e.r.s..V.A.L.U.
0080	45 00 53 00 20 00 28 00 40 00 31 00 2c 00 20 00	E.S..(@.1.,..
0090	40 00 32 00 2c 00 20 00 40 00 33 00 2c 00 20 00	@.2.,..@.3.,..
00a0	40 00 34 00 29 00 3b 00 00 00 e7 5a 00 09 04 d0	@.4.);....Z....
00b0	00 34 5a 00 40 00 31 00 20 00 69 00 6e 00 74 00	.4Z.@.1..i.n.t.
00c0	2c 00 40 00 32 00 20 00 69 00 6e 00 74 00 2c 00	..@.2..i.n.t.,..
00d0	40 00 33 00 20 00 76 00 61 00 72 00 62 00 69 00	@.3..v.a.r.b.i.
00e0	6e 00 61 00 72 00 79 00 28 00 32 00 29 00 2c 00	n.a.r.y.(.2.),..
00f0	40 00 34 00 20 00 6e 00 76 00 61 00 72 00 63 00	@.4..n.v.a.r.c.
0100	68 00 61 00 72 00 28 00 39 00 30 00 29 00 02 40	h.a.r.(.9.0)..@
0110	00 31 00 00 26 04 04 00 00 00 02 40 00 32 00	.1.&.....@.2.
0120	00 26 04 04 00 00 00 00 02 40 00 33 00 00 a5 02	.&.....@.3....
0130	00 02 00 00 00 02 40 00 34 00 00 e7 b4 00 09 04@.4.....
0140	d0 00 34 b4 00 3c 00 41 00 6e 00 73 00 77 00 65	..4..<.A.n.s.w.e
0150	00 72 00 20 00 54 00 79 00 70 00 65 00 3d 00 22	.r..T.y.p.e.=."
0160	00 53 00 54 00 52 00 49 00 4e 00 47 00 22 00 3e	.S.T.R.I.N.G.>
0170	00 3c 00 43 00 68 00 75 00 6e 00 6b 00 20 00 54	<.C.h.u.n.k..T
0180	00 79 00 70 00 65 00 3d 00 22 00 53 00 54 00 52	.y.p.e.=."S.T.R
0190	00 49 00 4e 00 47 00 22 00 20 00 43 00 6f 00 6e	.I.N.G.".C.o.n
01a0	00 66 00 69 00 64 00 65 00 6e 00 63 00 65 00 3d	.f.i.d.e.n.c.e.=
01b0	00 22 00 50 00 6f 00 6f 00 72 00 22 00 3e 00 74	..".P.o.o.r.">t
01c0	00 65 00 73 00 74 00 20 00 73 00 74 00 75 00 64	.e.s.t..s.t.u.d
01d0	00 65 00 6e 00 74 00 3c 00 2f 00 43 00 68 00 75	.e.n.t.<./C.n.u
01e0	00 6e 00 6b 00 3e 00 3c 00 2f 00 41 00 6e 00 73	.n.k.><./A.n.s
01f0	00 77 00 65 00 72 00 3e 00	.w.e.r.>

0000	00 12 3f 53 02 ce 00 0f b0 71 61 67 08 00 45 00	..?s.....qag..E.
0010	01 2e 05 23 40 00 7f 06 c0 2c 80 1e 1a f7 80 1e	...#@.....
0020	1a 47 f0 87 05 99 8d 99 84 54 ef ea 7c 98 50 18	.G.....T.. P.
0030	40 c0 b3 47 00 00 03 01 01 06 00 00 01 00 ff ff	@..G.....
0040	0a 00 02 00 00 00 e7 74 00 09 04 d0 00 34 74 00t.....4t.
0050	49 00 4e 00 53 00 45 00 52 00 54 00 20 00 49 00	I.N.S.E.R.T..I.
0060	4e 00 54 00 4f 00 20 00 53 00 74 00 75 00 64 00	N.T.O..S.t.u.d.
0070	65 00 6e 00 74 00 41 00 6e 00 73 00 77 00 65 00	e.n.t.A.n.s.w.e.
0080	72 00 73 00 20 00 56 00 41 00 4c 00 55 00 45 00	r.s..V.A.L.U.E.
0090	53 00 20 00 28 00 40 00 31 00 2c 00 20 00 40 00	S..(@.1.,..@.
00a0	32 00 2c 00 20 00 40 00 33 00 2c 00 20 00 47 00	2.,..@.3.,..G
00b0	45 00 54 00 44 00 41 00 54 00 45 00 28 00 29 00	E.T.D.A.T.E.(.)
00c0	29 00 3b 00 00 00 e7 38 00 09 04 d0 00 34 38 00);....8....48.
00d0	40 00 31 00 20 00 69 00 6e 00 74 00 2c 00 40 00	@.1..i.n.t.,@
00e0	32 00 20 00 6e 00 76 00 61 00 72 00 63 00 68 00	2..n.v.a.r.c.h.
00f0	61 00 72 00 28 00 35 00 29 00 2c 00 40 00 33 00	a.r.(.5.),..@.3.
0100	20 00 69 00 6e 00 74 00 02 40 00 31 00 00 26 04	.i.n.t..@.1..&
0110	04 e9 00 00 00 02 40 00 32 00 00 e7 0a 00 09 04@.2.....
0120	d0 00 34 0a 00 43 00 4c 00 50 00 31 00 36 00 02	..4..C.L.P.1.6..
0130	40 00 33 00 00 26 04 04 8e 00 00 00	@.3...&.....

```

0000 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 00 0f b0 71 61 67 08 00 45 00 ..?S.....qag..E.
0010 01 f6 0c 35 40 00 7f 06 b8 52 80 1e 1a f7 80 1e ...5@.....R.....
0020 1a 47 f0 b4 05 99 8c 3a 0b 93 ac dd 7d 07 50 18 .G.....:.....}tP.
0030 40 9a a0 9b 00 00 17 03 01 01 c9 51 46 94 4a 00 @-.....c.f...(.x...
0040 29 ec 34 d2 3b b9 e5 8a 15 59 94 a4 c0 14 d6 cc ).4.;....Y.....
0050 30 5b a1 08 9d d2 37 45 f7 bb 48 59 3f 97 48 07 0[....7E...HY?.H.
0060 cf 61 a0 df 77 45 4e f2 90 98 29 b7 c1 02 e8 58 .a..wEN...).X
0070 ef d1 e2 97 00 25 2c d7 f2 b0 3d 38 62 35 8a 58 ....%,...=8p5.X
0080 c2 de 8f 63 c8 94 5a 8e 60 0d 5f 22 4a fc c8 48 ...c..Z..`_"J..H
0090 41 8f cd d7 6a 1d 0a b6 e6 96 61 07 13 36 80 ee A...j.....a..6..
00a0 dd ce a1 ad 94 56 3e 3e d8 ac cc d1 4d 84 89 89 ...V>>....M...
00b0 88 6c f6 f5 9b dd 85 31 af 72 e8 95 9c 2a 73 bd )......1.r...*s.
00c0 e8 90 d4 8f cc 9c b1 4f 18 e1 f3 78 b6 3a 0f c1 .....O.....x...
00d0 66 49 54 2b f5 d4 10 de f0 2f f3 cd 54 75 86 82 .IT+...../.Tu..
00e0 21 80 61 50 e4 55 b1 b8 f8 ad 5a 3e 59 b3 a6 43 .aP.U....Z>Y..C
00f0 a7 80 28 e1 46 6b 3a 8e 37 bf 18 9b d0 f2 da b1 ..(Fk:7.....
0100 00 79 51 8b 33 4b da 2b 26 b3 02 68 bb e7 b5 5f .yQ.3K.+&.h..._
0110 32 92 2a 3e e8 b6 37 66 40 5c 74 e2 ed 11 37 d5 2.*>..7f@\t...7.
0120 9d 9d cc 7e bc bd 8d 56 55 23 5f 20 2f ab 21 56 ....~...vU#_ /!V
0130 4f 9c 78 90 c4 e0 f5 30 7c ad f8 7e a5 e1 16 a1 0.x....0|...~....
0140 c7 31 cd 7c 2b 72 de ff 60 11 4c be 75 e5 dd ab .1.|+r...L.u...
0150 86 33 fa 76 29 42 ec 02 e0 7d 41 b6 ad 5b 4d 54 .3.v)B...}A..[MT
0160 fc 80 03 bc a1 48 0e 1d ac bd 30 2e 6e 3f ae 43 .....H.....0.n?.C
0170 d6 d8 a3 a9 18 29 98 fd da 8e 7f 48 3c 05 c1 fd .....).H<...
0180 cf 6b 77 8c 5c f9 39 9d 64 39 09 78 57 55 5e 51 .kw.\.9.d9.xwUuAQ
0190 36 3d 08 e9 25 47 90 52 b1 ea 6b 3b 3e ee 3a 88 5=.%G.R..k;>...
01a0 05 25 0e e0 c2 2a 1e 85 3b eb 06 8c cb cf 03 24 %...*...;.....$
01b0 e3 e7 59 b3 ee eb 1b 47 73 e4 09 e6 98 df 36 3c ..Y....Gs.....6x
01c0 36 db d7 03 59 2f cd 48 aa 89 ba f3 96 c8 a4 7a 6...Y/.H.....Z
01d0 c4 40 fd 4d 53 7a 87 8c 71 3f c2 81 0b 9f 8a f1 @.MSz..q?...
01e0 47 82 bd d7 3a 19 0c 93 ff e8 57 f1 28 2c 97 12 G.....w.(...
01f0 26 87 88 15 a8 dd 82 7c e3 69 82 4b dd e2 44 e6 &.....|.i.k..D.
0200 fe e5 26 0a ..&.

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0000 00 12 3f 53 02 ce 00 0f b0 71 61 67 08 00 45 00 ..?S.....qag..E.
0010 01 43 0c 37 40 00 7f 06 b9 03 80 1e 1a f7 80 1e .C.7@.....
0020 1a 47 f0 b4 05 99 8c 3a 0d be ac dd 7d 74 50 18 .G.....:.....}tP.
0030 40 2d a1 e6 00 00 17 03 01 01 16 e3 9c a2 9a ee @-.....c.f...(.x...
0040 86 b0 a3 0f 63 d4 66 bf 13 d1 28 bc 78 f7 f1 c4 ...<...~...4.....
0050 d9 84 ce 3c 13 de 7e 87 e9 34 07 b0 0e 15 1c 0a ...<...~...4.....
0060 2b d2 a9 64 1d fe 87 02 af 32 ca ca 25 ab c3 34 +.d....2.%..4
0070 5c 45 5b 52 cd 37 ac 99 e0 47 fb b8 ef 45 7e 15 \E[R.7...G...E~
0080 96 2e 22 6e d7 47 1e c9 08 73 13 2e 75 1e a8 9b .n.G...s...u...
0090 aa 54 91 74 1a 49 65 28 27 82 fd 04 e7 1a 94 f3 .f.t.Ie('.....
00a0 44 53 02 7e 58 60 e7 84 2c c2 3c 70 8d af 13 53 0s.~X'....<p...s
00b0 f4 4d 1d 18 dc dd ce 98 36 a9 ab 71 c1 5a d4 ea .M.....6..q.Z..
00c0 68 41 12 89 72 c9 82 25 db 82 47 52 1c 64 e6 f4 ha..r...%.GR.d..
00d0 b9 20 4f a7 5a 15 12 d9 3b d1 0b 3f 80 fa 28 6b .O.Z...;?...?.(k
00e0 b3 10 e2 59 bf 13 47 ee 63 1c a2 ca b0 c3 36 90 ...Y..G.c.....6.
00f0 91 75 9e 66 a4 82 43 eb 84 c1 e7 80 d6 63 f7 d6 .u.f..C.....c..
0100 e1 f7 13 14 6e d8 22 3d 75 67 fb 00 7d c4 f2 e4 .....n."=ug..}...
0110 22 92 ac 3d 7e 1a ff e1 fe 66 8e 9a 0e d3 25 8b ...=...f...%.
0120 75 17 f6 ed 41 3c 9c 4b 9c 3a b7 94 e4 6a 38 44 u...A<.K...j80
0130 ef 59 8e 9a 75 0f 47 b7 4f c5 58 53 b1 9d 87 86 .Y..u.G.O.XS...
0140 8c 46 c4 af 89 98 5d f8 92 fe ae 51 e7 21 d3 8c .F.....]....O.!...
0150 cb .

```

We have thus verified that the network traffic corresponding to student responses is encrypted. Such encryption substantially decreases the likelihood of students being able to acquire other students' submitted responses.

7 Future work

There are a number of projects that would be interesting extensions of the system described in this thesis.

One obvious extension is remote quiz-taking. This thesis only addresses quizzes that are taken in the classroom. In a remote electronic quiz-taking scenario, the quiz is posted online, and the students take it from any location outside of the classroom. This type of quiz is an electronic version of a take-home exam. Our encryption method works just as well for the remote scenario as for the in-class scenario and probably would not need to be changed. The remote scenario has the same fundamental cheating concerns as the classroom version, but also presents additional opportunities for cheating. The method of student authentication we used for the in-class scenario, i.e. student logon with a quiz-specific password, may not be appropriate in the remote scenario. Providing a password at quiz start time would be possible if students started the quiz at the same time. An encrypted message containing the password could be sent to all logged in students, for example. In addition, if the remote quiz is to be taken at a certain time by all students, database access can be disabled until the time of the quiz. If it is acceptable that the students take the quiz at any time, they can be given a password in advance and a timer can be implemented that would track when a student logs in and forces the student to log out after a certain amount of time has passed. Note that this method has the potential for more cheating than requiring a designated start time, since one student can take the quiz first and disclose the questions to another student.

Another issue to consider with remote quiz-taking is how to ensure that only students registered for the class log in to the tablets. One method would be to run a script on the tablet that would check the student user name against a list of registered students. As each class is likely to have such a list of students stored in the central database, adding this functionality would be quite easy.

Another addition to the system would be to extend the aggregator to help detect cheating. It could use its similarity metrics and clustering methods to find entries that are similar and unusual [Smith, 2006]. The clustering would be enhanced by providing functionality that would allow the system to automatically detect the location of tablets and provide the aggregator with that information. In this way, the aggregator could also check answer similarity for students sitting near each other.

An addition that would make quiz administration more efficient is the automated grading of the quizzes once they are submitted to the database.

It would be interesting to analyze the behavior of the system when it is up and running. Shrobe discusses a system that performs “Computational Vulnerability Analysis” to adaptively determine what vulnerabilities are present in a system [Shrobe, 2002]. This system can be used in CLP to help determine if the system has been compromised, for example by students’ unauthorized access to the database.

One of the most interesting extensions would be to integrate handwriting recognition with the authentication. “Distinctive Touch” [Kleek, 2004] is a system that was developed to authenticate users by what the developers call a passdoodle, which is a handwritten “doodle” drawn by the user in digital ink which acts as a user name and password. Distinctive touch enhances handwriting recognition so that it would be appropriate to authenticate a user. In addition to identifying the sketch, Distinctive Touch also looks at stroke order and the speed that the sketch is drawn.

8 Summary and Contributions

This thesis analyzes the security risks associated with using CLP to electronically administer a quiz in class, implements an infrastructure which reduces those risks, and lays the groundwork for future enhancements. The system which is implemented can be used to authenticate students to the database and to ensure that the database network traffic is not readable by unauthorized individuals. We discuss the vulnerabilities in the current implementation and ways to increase the trust in the system, as well as a number of projects to expand the system.

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